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Summary: For the recording industry the case seems clear. Music sales are down for the 
third straight year. CD sales are now almost 20% lower than in 2000. Despite their 
successful campaign against Napster two years ago, online music sharing through peer-
to-peer service such as KaZaA and Gnutella continues to flourish. To re-establish its pre-
Napster margins, industry thinking goes, the record labels have to put an end to illegal 
music sharing over the Internet once and for all. Hence, the recent decision by the 
industry-leading Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) to take the fight 
directly to file sharers, not merely to commercial file sharing services. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
For the recording industry the case seems clear. Music sales are down for the third 
straight year. CD sales are now almost 20% lower than in 2000. Despite their successful 
campaign against Napster two years ago, online music sharing through peer-to-peer 
service such as KaZaA and Gnutella continues to flourish. To re-establish its pre-Napster 
margins, industry thinking goes, the record labels have to put an end to illegal music 
sharing over the Internet once and for all. Hence, the recent decision by the industry-
leading Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) to take the fight directly to file 
sharers, not merely to commercial file sharing services.[1] 
 
The legal battle between the mighty recording industry and a group of mostly students, 
who account for the lion’s share of illegal music sharing, is fascinating in itself. Attempting 
to thwart any David vs Goliath sympathies for file sharers, the recording industry has 
sought the moral high ground. Online music sharing, the recording industry argues, 
amounts to organized theft that threatens not only the survival of commercial music but 
also the very foundation of artistic and intellectual creativity. 
 
To most, such allusions are mere rhetoric. After all, online music sharing primarily 
threatens the recording industry’s monopoly over music distribution on which its business 
model has rested for decades and from which it has profited handsomely. But in a very 
real sense the current battle over music piracy is indeed about much more. It is a battle 
over the heart of the emerging information society, a battle over who gets to own what 
and on what terms in the digital age. Intellectual property law has long been regarded as 
an arcane and mundane body of rules, accessible only to a few practitioners and of 
relevance only to inventors and a few major corporations. But in an information age, 
intellectual property rules define what is property. As an increasing number of goods and 
services are digitized, these rules set the terms of exchange, commercial and non-
commercial, in economy and society. 
 
This paper assesses the technological, business, and political drivers of current 
intellectual property dynamics in the advanced industrial economies, particularly in the 
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area of copyright.[2] Its central thesis is that copyright producers –especially the music, 
motion picture and publishing industries– are pursuing a two-pronged strategy to defend 
their core assets and business models against the challenge posed by digital network 
technologies. Through a set of technologies –dubbed Digital Rights Management (DRM)– 
industry seeks to recreate control over information distribution. Because virtually any 
electronic lock can be broken at some point by somebody, the second part of the strategy 
dramatically strengthens the legal position of copyright owners. New laws criminalize the 
development of electronic lock-breaking circumvention technologies and provide copyright 
holders with an array of new legal tools to enforce their rights. 
 
This ‘double punch’ of law and technology is fundamentally altering the balance of 
producer and consumer rights upon which copyright has traditionally rested. Worse, many 
of the crucial decisions are no longer taken on the national level, depriving diverse 
stakeholders of an ability to shape the direction of critical policy. With respect to legal 
aspects, decision-making in this area has moved up, taking place on the international 
level and –in the case of Europe– the level of the European Union. DRM technologies, in 
turn, are developed on the firm level and are often deployed without consumers’ 
knowledge. The result is the real possibility that information technologies –far from 
creating an information paradise accessible to all– will lead to a shrinking ‘information 
commons’ resting on universal pay-per-view and pay-per-use. 
 
The challenge for policy makers is to balance the legitimate interests of copyright holders 
to control their property with the public interest of broad availability and diffusion of 
information. Yet the politics of intellectual property policymaking –particularly the 
simultaneous upward and downward shifting of decision-making responsibilities– make 
this an increasingly difficult undertaking. As a first step, we must broaden the basis of 
discussion. Music royalties are certainly important, but the underlying issues are too vital 
for a large number of stakeholders to remain on the sidelines as recording industry and 
music pirates fight it out. 
 
To help establish a basis for broadened discussion, this paper provides an analytic map of 
the critical drivers and issues. Its main goal is to locate the current debate over online 
music sharing in a larger context of digital challenges, business strategies and public 
policy. The paper proceeds as follows. The following section examines the digital 
challenge and shows that digital technologies are a double-edged sword –they not only 
make copying easier but also provide copyright holders with new defences and measures 
of control. Section three sketches the double punch of law and technology, epitomized by 
the provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in the United States. In law 
as well as in practice, copyright appears to depart from balancing producer and consumer 
interests, instead giving way to publicly sanctioned, unrestricted private enforcement. 
There are several reasons to be concerned about this development, outlined in section 
four. The departure from balancing, I argue, is in large part rooted in the politics of 
intellectual property rights making. In section five, I show that copyright policy making in 
recent years has been characterized by forum shopping and elite bargaining that have 
been very favourable to industry interests. Against the background of these political 
drivers, I assess the potential to fight music piracy in a balanced fashion, and sketch 
some elements of a strategy to do so in section six. The final section concludes by looking 
ahead to future challenges. 
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Copyright and the Digital Challenge: From Napster to Digital Rights Management 
 
Ideas and information have a peculiar character that has occupied policy makers and 
thinkers for ages. As Thomas Jefferson remarked, 
 ‘If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it 
is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively 
possess as long as he keeps it to himself, but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into 
the possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar 
character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the 
whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without 
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening 
me.’[3] 
  
In this passage, Jefferson beautifully describes two characteristics of information goods 
that economists call their non-rivalrous and their non-excludability. The former means that 
my consumption does not diminish your ability to consume, and the latter implies that I 
cannot control who consumes after my initial release of the product. These characteristics 
led Jefferson to conclude, ‘Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property’.[4] 
To nevertheless provide economic incentives for creative enterprise, societies have 
deliberately created intellectual property rights. These rights grant authors and innovators 
temporary monopolies over the expression of their ideas to foster the production and 
distribution of knowledge and innovation. For a ‘market of ideas’ to flourish, authors and 
innovators must exert some control over the distribution of their works in order to charge a 
price for them.  
 
Piracy and counterfeiting are of course as old as intellectual property law itself (Spar, 
2001). But technological limitations and sufficient law enforcement have until recently 
rendered piracy a manageable nuisance, rather than a potent threat to the system. The 
non-commercial copying of a few analog records and tapes at home, for example, barely 
affected the music industry’s bottom line. Not only was such copying time-intensive, the 
quality of copies was also poor. Piracy on a scale where it made commercial sense, in 
turn, was fairly easily detectable.[5] Occasional irritation about illegal copying 
notwithstanding, the recording industry has profited handsomely from its de facto 
monopoly over the physical distribution of music. 
  
Napster and Perfect Copies 
Digital network technologies, however, pose a fundamental challenge to the existing 
order. Digital technologies permit perfect copying of information at a marginal cost of zero. 
The Internet enables the rapid transmission of such information around the world in real 
time, also at marginal cost zero. Anybody with a personal computer and a moderately fast 
Internet connection can therefore engage in copying and distribution of music on a scale 
that dwarfs the abilities of previous professional music pirates. 
 
MP3 digital file compression technology made the exchange of music over the Internet 
technically feasible, even with limited bandwidth.[6] Napster made it simple and fun. 
Written by Shawn Fanning, a college dropout, the free Napster software gave users 
access to all music files stored on the computers of everybody else connected to the 
service. The more people connected, the more everybody benefited. Four months after 
Fanning had e-mailed the software to a few friends, Napster had one million users. 
Another five months later, five million had signed up. And on its first birthday, the Napster 
community counted twenty million users, making it the most quickly diffusing online 
service in history.[7]  
  
 
That Napster almost immediately became the target of a legal assault by the recording 
industry and individual artists is well known. Less than two years after its creation, a court 
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order permanently shut Napster down, charging it with widespread facilitation of copyright 
infringement. But others were quick to take its place. While also relying on so-called peer-
to-peer (P2P) technology, services such as KaZaA and Gnutella are technically even 
more advanced than its famous predecessor. In contrast to Napster, these services no 
longer rely on a central database of available songs, making it infinitely harder to shut 
them down through a targeted action. After a short dip in online music sharing after 
Napster went offline, Internet-enabled music piracy has continued to prosper. By some 
recent estimates, 35 million Americans alone download music from the Internet.[8] 
 
After some initial uncertainty whether online music sharing indeed diminished legal music 
sales, there is now little doubt that rampant downloading is significantly affecting the 
industry’s bottom line.[9] Surveys indicate that frequent users of file-sharing services 
spent considerably less on CDs than comparable groups who do not download on a 
regular basis. Worldwide music sales in the first half of 2003 alone were down by almost 
11% compared with the same period one year earlier.[10] 
  
Figure 1. US compact disc sales, 1993-2002 
 
 
Source: RIAA 
  
 
Despite their prominence, Napster and its successors are not the only challenge to the 
music industry enabled by digital technology that is affecting the bottom line. The ability to 
make perfect copies at near zero cost has given a new boost to commercial piracy as 
well. Copying CDs is not only easier and feasible on a much larger scale than copying 
audiotapes; it also avoids the problem of diminishing quality. Predictably, in countries 
where Internet and particularly broadband Internet penetration is fairly low, users buy 
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pirated CDs from street vendors rather than downloading from their homes. In Europe, for 
example, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece –laggards in Internet adoption– have the 
biggest markets for pirated CDs, with illegal sales amounting to more than one quarter of 
total CD sales.[11] The situation is even worse in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and 
Latin America. The biggest source of pirated CDs and the highest percentage of illegal 
copies can be found in East Asia, however, with China’s 90% piracy rate leading the 
pack.[12] All in all, experts estimate that one in three CDs sold worldwide is pirated. 
 
Shocking as the numbers on commercial CD piracy may be, online music sharing à la 
Napster is by far the bigger challenge to the music industry. Commercial pirates challenge 
the record industry’s monopoly over music distribution, but not the distribution model itself. 
Internet-based file sharing, however, rests on a separation of music from its physical 
carrier. Once loaded into a computer and made available over the Internet, music 
becomes non-rivalrous and non-excludable, much like the way Jefferson characterized 
the nature of ideas. Yet markets require scarcity for their proper functioning. As Brad 
DeLong and A. Michael Froomkin have argued, markets only allocate resources efficiently 
when goods are rivalrous, excludable, and transparent (DeLong and Froomkin, 2000). 
Information goods –including digitized music separated from its physical carrier– tend not 
to exhibit these characteristics, making market failure the norm, not the exception. 
 
We can already see the breakdown of markets in this environment. An increasing number 
of file-sharing service users now believe that music ought to be free and that there is 
absolutely nothing wrong with downloading music off the web.[13] In fact, the music 
industry’s problem increasingly is not the fight against file-sharing services, but the fight 
against the Napster mentality, that is, the expectation that music is available free of 
charge. The recent lawsuits against individual users are as much about changing people’s 
perception of file sharing as they are about setting precedents of tough enforcement. 
 
The lack of scarcity as a consequence of lifting music off its physical carriers also haunts 
efforts to establish legal online music distribution services. A central issue that has 
beleaguered these efforts for years is pricing. Should services be based on monthly 
subscriptions or should users pay per song? I return to the prospect for legal services 
below. Suffice it to say at this point that there is absolutely no reason why downloading a 
song should cost 99 cents, as is becoming a quasi industry standard, other than it being 
roughly the cost of a CD divided by the average number of songs.[14] The marginal cost 
of distributing one more copy of a song online is zero. Supply and demand cannot help 
firms set prices when goods are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. 
 
In sum, Napster and Internet-based music sharing is not simply a new and more efficient 
form of piracy. It is an all-out assault on the model of music distribution upon which the 
recording industry rests. Moreover, by enabling the separation of the information from its 
physical carrier, digital technologies essentially take us back to the problem faced by 
Jefferson and his contemporaries more than two centuries ago –how to provide economic 
incentives for the production of goods that tend to be non-rivalrous and non-excludable? 
  
DRM and (Almost) Perfect Locks 
 
So far, the discussion certainly suggests digital technologies are a one-way threat to 
copyright. But digital technologies are a double-edged sword. The very same technologies 
that can undermine intellectual property can also grant a measure of control far greater 
than anything familiar from previous eras.[15] Dubbed ‘digital rights management’ or 
DRM, these technologies are a set of electronic locks for digital content such as music, 
video and text. Content is not distributed as raw data but rather inside a secure container. 
Accessing the content requires a key and control over key distribution grants de facto 
control over content distribution. 
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An example of DRM is the Content Scrambling System (CSS) that is built into every DVD 
player. Contrary to most music CDs, data on DVDs is encrypted and requires a decryption 
key for playback. DVDs can therefore not be copied as easily as music CDs. The obvious 
problem with DRM is the need for uniform standards, however. Lock and key have to go 
together. In the case of DVD players, America’s motion picture industry has been able to 
force manufacturers to incorporate the industry’s CSS standard into every device. This 
influence stems from the motion picture industry’s controlling of critical DVD technology 
patents that every manufacturer must license. Predictably, incorporation of CSS is a 
licensing condition (Samuelson, 2003:43). 
 
The recording industry has not enjoyed the same influence over equipment manufacturers 
as their Hollywood colleagues. Its Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) has so far not led 
to the ubiquitous adoption of a single standard.[16] Some industry representatives have 
therefore called on policy makers to mandate all devices capable of playing digital music 
to be equipped with DRM. In the meantime, multiple corporate solutions are competing in 
the market place. Microsoft’s technology, embedded in its Windows Media Player 9, is an 
industry leader, but some providers of legal online music services have decided to go with 
Microsoft’s competitors instead, fragmenting the market. 
 
DRM as such of course does not restrict copying. All it does is return a measure of control 
to content producers, such as the recording or motion picture industries. What industry 
does with this measure of control is a matter of corporate strategy. In the case of music, 
for example, DRM provides record companies almost limitless latitude. It can be used to 
prevent any copying, to permit only a single copy, to prevent burning of songs onto CDs, 
or to only permit playback during the first 48 hours after purchase, to name only a few. In 
short, it gives the record industry close control over what users actually do with the 
industry’s products. 
 
What should we make of DRM? The answer depends on one’s perspective. At least three 
distinct views should usefully be distinguished. The first is the officially stated position of 
copyright industries; the second is a microeconomic point of view; and the third stems 
from sceptics who are concerned about consumer rights in the emerging information 
society. 
 
According to the recording, motion picture and publishing industries, DRM are simply tools 
to combat piracy and counterfeiting. Anybody who downloads music from the web without 
paying royalties is committing theft, the reasoning goes, and DRM is merely a way for 
owners of intellectual property to defend their rights. This reasoning seems to have 
convinced a large number of policy makers in many countries and makes possible the 
‘double punch’ strategy, as I will explain below. 
 
A second perspective takes DeLong and Froomkin’s observation about the character of 
information goods as a starting point. If the problem is indeed that information goods are 
non-excludable and non-rivalrous, then DRM may just be the saviour of markets. In other 
words, DRM enables information goods to function more or less like conventional goods, 
re-establishing excludability and thus an artificial notion of rivalry and scarcity. One set of 
technologies challenged the status quo by separating music from its physical carrier; a 
second set of technologies now re-establishes that status quo by wrapping music inside 
an electronic container whose distribution can again be controlled. The only point of DRM, 
in short, would be to prevent market failures on a massive scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Area: International Economy – WP Nº 29/2003 
11/19/2003 
From a sceptical consumer rights point of view, finally, a different picture emerges. 
As Pam Samuelson (2003:44), a leading copyright expert, has remarked,  
‘The main goal of DRM mandates is not, as the industry often claims, to stop ‘piracy’ but 
to change consumer expectations. In the content industry’s view, consumers don’t have 
rights; they have expectations.’ 
  
The expectations Samuelson is referring to are about what consumers may and may not 
do with digital content. If content providers do not give consumers permission to burn 
legitimately downloaded songs onto a CD, consumers may just have to accept it.[17] If 
listening to a song five times during a 48-hour period were a lot cheaper than purchasing 
a right to unlimited listening, consumers had better adjust their listening patterns. DRM, in 
short, gives the music industry a set of tools to initiate a paradigm change in the 
entertainment and information industries. Rather than selling physical music carriers and 
leaving it up to consumers what to do with them, the industry would exert much greater 
‘after sales’ control over consumers and their consumption. 
 
Each of these perspectives has credence. As shown above, digital network technologies 
have made copyright infringement vastly easier, seriously impacting legitimate music 
sales. DRM is certainly one way to turn the tables on pirates. It is also true that DRM –by 
re-establishing excludability and rivalry– seeks to resolve the underlying tension between 
information goods and copyright. It might thereby enable established business models, 
policies and law enforcement strategies to continue to work, or at least to minimize 
adjustment costs. 
 
Yet a strong case can also be made that DRM is indeed about fundamentally changing 
the relationship of producers and consumers of digital information, as Samuelson and 
others suspect. There are several indications that content producers are employing DRM 
for much more than merely fighting piracy or ensuring that markets work properly. To curb 
the re-import of DVDs produced for foreign markets, for example, Hollywood is equipping 
discs with regional codes. DVDs produced for the Asian market will not work in a 
European player and vice versa.[18] The goal here is market segmentation and 
differential pricing, not preventing unlawful copying. 
 
Similarly, the few successful legal online music services are using DRM to offer diverse 
products. MusicNet, a joint venture by America Online and RealNetworks, for example, 
offers AOL users three different subscription levels. Listening to twenty songs a month 
online and downloading another twenty costs US$3.95 a month. Unlimited listening and 
downloading comes at US$9.95 a month. In both cases, however, users cannot burn 
downloaded songs onto a CD. The right to burn ten downloaded songs per month 
increases the monthly fee to US$17.95. In addition to these existing subscriptions, AOL is 
considering a variety of other packages, including à la carte burning.[19] Only with DRM 
do service providers have the ability to control which songs users may listen to while 
being online, which songs they can download to their own computers and which songs 
they can burn. It is evident that industry is beginning to deploy DRM for much more than 
just battling piracy. 
 
 
To the recording and motion picture industries, DRM could be a panacea. Not only does it 
help them turn the table on pirates; it also provides the capability for a set of product and 
marketing strategic options that are truly unprecedented. The only problem is that 
electronic locks, like all locks, can be broken. Where there is encryption, there are 
hackers trying to crack and get around it. To make the world ‘safe for DRM’, copyright 
holders have therefore pursued a complementary strategy of getting policy makers to put 
in place swift penalties against code breaking and code breakers. These two elements –
DRM and sweeping laws banning tampering with them– constitute the double punch of 
law and technology that could fundamentally remake copyright. Having shown that digital 
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technology as such is not a nemesis of copyright, and that it can in fact be deployed to 
dramatically strengthen right holders’ control, the following section turns to recent legal 
developments in Europe and the United States that constitute the other half of the double 
punch. 
  
Copyright Reform, Anti-circumvention Provisions and the Threat to Fair Use 
 
The rapid rise of the Internet and electronic commerce accelerated already ongoing 
efforts in Europe and the United States to adopt copyright for the digital age.[20] One 
aspect of the information revolution, however, is that many regulatory issues can no 
longer simply be settled in the domestic realm as digital goods and services cross borders 
at the click of a mouse. Animated by influential copyright holders, European and American 
governments therefore sought a new international copyright treaty through the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a Geneva-based United Nations affiliate.[21] 
The treaty’s provisions have been incorporated into US law through the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) and are becoming law in Europe as national governments 
implement the European Union Copyright Directive (EUCD). 
  
The bulk of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, completed in 1996, consists of fairly 
uncontroversial provisions to ready copyright for the digital age.[22] These include 
classifying computer software as literary works to make it eligible for copyright protection, 
extending protection to certain aspects of databases and guaranteeing authors the 
exclusive right of authorizing commercial rental of their works. 
 
The really critical provisions, however, relate to rights management technologies. Articles 
11 and 12 require signatories to ban the circumvention of technological mechanisms 
owners of copyright may deploy to protect their works and to criminalize the development 
or distribution of circumvention technologies. In other words, the provisions not only make 
it illegal to tamper with an electronic lock, they also criminalize merely telling somebody 
how a lock may be broken. 
 
The implementation of these WIPO provisions in the United States through the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) has been highly controversial among copyright experts. 
Already broadly worded in the law, the courts have interpreted the DMCA’s anti-
circumvention clauses even more broadly (Samuelson, 1999).[23] Paradoxically, in its five 
years of existence, the Act has made headlines not for enabling decisive action against 
commercial piracy but primarily for publicity surrounding legal actions against scientists 
and researchers.[24] US software companies, manufacturers of electronic books (or e-
books) and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) have on several 
occasions prevented researchers from presenting work on electronic security systems 
and encryption at scientific conferences because publications of their findings could aid 
others in circumventing DRM systems. In the most chilling case, a Russian programmer, 
Dmitry Sklyarov, was arrested by the FBI and jailed for several weeks after he had 
presented work on Adobe’s e-book DRM system at a conference in Las Vegas.[25] 
 
 
Even more worrying from a public policy point of view, however, is the DMCA’s 
encroachment on what in American law and jurisprudence is called ‘fair use’ of 
copyrighted material. Historically, copyright has always been about balancing the 
legitimate interests of both producers and consumers. One tool for such balancing are fair 
use exceptions. Copyright statutes include instances of permitted, ‘non-infringing’ copying 
of copyrighted materials. Making a copy of a videotape one has purchased to avoid 
carrying the original back and forth between a city residence and a summer home, for 
example, is entirely legitimate. Similarly, one need not pay royalties to photocopy an 
article from the newspaper in order to mail it to a friend. Quoting protected works in 
academic publications or other reviews is another instance of non-infringing use. 
Area: International Economy – WP Nº 29/2003 
11/19/2003 
The combination of DRM and the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions puts such fair 
use in jeopardy, however. Nothing in the law prevents the owner of a legitimately 
purchased CD from uploading a few songs onto her laptop to listen to them at work, for 
example. But an increasing number of ordinary audio CDs now come with copy 
protection, making such perfectly legal copying technically impossible. Worse, if the CD 
owner went on the Internet to learn how to circumvent the electronic lock that prevents 
him from exercising his fair use right, he would commit a criminal act. The person posting 
such information on the web would of course also be in serious trouble.[26] 
 
In short, while the DMCA does not alter fair use exceptions in law, it is changing them in 
practice. By technically demarcating what is and is not possible, DRM systems are 
imposing consumption patterns. While consumers legally still have the right to engage in 
certain practices not permitted by DRM, doing so would entail circumventing these 
systems, which is illegal. 
 
Europe’s implementation of the WIPO Treaty provisions is very similar to that of the 
United States.[27] Mirroring the DMCA’s language, Article 6 of the EUCD bans the use, 
development and commercial marketing of circumvention technologies.[28] Yet Europe’s 
law in practice differs from America’s in two important respects: first, European courts 
have considerably less leeway interpreting the law, making an overly broad interpretation 
of the anti-circumvention provisions and the targeting of individual researchers and 
consumers less likely[29]; and secondly, Europe’s law –more clearly than the DMCA– 
specifies that the provisions are aimed in particular at commercial piracy and the 
development of circumvention technologies for commercial purposes.[30] Enacted just 
over two years ago, it is still too early to tell exactly how Europe’s courts will interpret and 
enforce the EUCD, and whether it will shake up Europe’s intellectual property landscape 
the way the DMCA has done in the US.[31] 
 
Despite the important difference between European and American recent copyright 
reforms, the implementation of the WIPO Treaty provision banning circumvention 
technologies provides a solid legal foundation for an increasing reliance of DRM to protect 
copyright in the emerging information society on both sides of the Atlantic. If the American 
experience is an indicator of things to come, however, the double punch of law and 
technology appears better suited to change consumer expectations and to dramatically 
alter the balance of producer and consumer rights than to effectively curb piracy. The 
following section analyzes potential implications of the double punch for competition, 
consumer rights and the character of the information society. 
  
The Double Punch and Reasons for Concern 
 
The double punch of law and technology consists of the deployment of electronic locks for 
digital content via DRM technologies and a new set of legal provisions that make 
tampering with these locks a crime.[32] The recording, motion picture and publishing 
industries are clearly pursuing this strategy in their quest against piracy and policy makers 
have so far been willing to go along. As shown, however, to industry, the double punch 
has significant appeal beyond just curbing piracy. 
 
There are three reasons in particular why policy makers and other stakeholders should 
give the double punch a second look. Policy makers should consider: a) its effects on 
competition; b) its effects on the balance of consumer and producer rights; and c) the 
implications for the character of the emerging information society. 
  
The Terms of Competition: Strengthening Incumbents and Maintaining the Status Quo 
 
The double punch of law and technology is above all an attempt by incumbents to 
maintain the status quo in their industries. For decades, the business models of the major 
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record labels, Hollywood studios and publishing houses have rested on controlling the 
production and physical distribution of discs, tapes and paper that contain information. 
Digital network technologies provide an almost infinitely configurable set of tools to 
disseminate information and therefore a potentially limitless number of challenges to the 
incumbents’ core business. So far, incumbents appear to respond to these challenges by 
seeking the enclosure of information in electronic containers, thereby trying to replicate 
the offline basis of their success in the new online environment. 
 
By supporting the double punch, policy makers are adopting an inherently status quo bias 
in one of the most dynamic market environments of memory. The terms of competition in 
the emerging information markets are therefore heavily tilted in favour of incumbents, to 
the detriment of new entrants, innovative new business models and quite possibly 
consumers. In light of the rapid diffusion of broadband Internet access and the hassle of 
going to a store to buy a plastic box that contains a dozen music files, it is a testament of 
incumbents’ strength that CD sales have not dropped significantly more than they already 
have.  
  
Balancing Consumer and Producer Rights: Is ‘Fair Use’ a Right or Deadweight Loss? 
Intellectual property has always been a means to an end –to foster the growth of 
knowledge and information available to the public.[33] As a matter of principle, intellectual 
property rules have therefore sought to balance incentives for authors and innovators with 
the public’s interest in availability and broad diffusion. One tool for such balancing, as 
noted above, are consumer rights under the rubric of ‘fair use’ exceptions.[34] 
 
Fair use exceptions are not merely an externality. Their anchoring in law is a conscious 
attempt by policy makers to foster innovation, creativity and public discourse through 
limited, uncontrolled use of copyrighted material. That is precisely why many fair use 
exceptions cover library uses, academic work, quotation for the purpose of public debate 
and satire. Fair use exceptions thus constitute the core of consumer rights and are meant 
to mediate and balance copyright holders’ temporary monopolies. 
 
For a long time, technological limitations made it painless for copyright owners to ‘grant’ 
fair use exceptions. Trying to collect royalties every time a reader made a photocopy of an 
article to send to a friend was simply not feasible at a cost that made economic sense. 
Likewise, since there was no way of cost-effectively preventing an owner of a CD from 
lending it to a friend there was really no point objecting to such practice. Many of the 
rights consumers have become accustomed to have therefore essentially been self-
sustaining as a result of available technologies’ limitations. 
 
Digital technologies are changing firms’ calculus, however. DRM gives copyright owners 
sweeping control over their products after the initial sale, and they enable such control at 
extraordinarily low cost. Whereas it was not feasible to charge newspaper readers for a 
photocopied article, it is feasible to charge a reader a fee to access an article sent by a 
friend. Similarly, whereas the recording industry could not reasonably charge for a tape 
recording off the radio, online services such as MusicNet and Rhapsody can fairly easily 
charge consumers for every track they want to burn onto a CD, and they are doing just 
that. 
 
 
The double punch thus clearly raises the question whether previously tolerated fair use 
exceptions constitute basic consumer rights, or if they were merely the result of economic 
deadweight loss that new digital technologies help eliminate. This question is neither an 
economic, nor a legal or technological question. It is fundamentally a political question 
that requires a broad discussion among an array of diverse stakeholders. Law and 
technology can be adopted to reflect a new political consensus. As it currently stands, 
Area: International Economy – WP Nº 29/2003 
11/19/2003 
however, developments in law and technology are driving the political discussion, not vice 
versa. 
 
The Emerging Information Society: Towards Universal Pay-per-Use and Sweeping 
Information Enclosures? 
In a market society, property rights regulate what can be owned, by whom and on what 
terms.[35] Owing to the digitization of goods and services, intellectual property rules 
become the property rights of the information age. For this reason, a growing number of 
commentators fear that the double punch is only the beginning of a sweeping 
transformation that goes far beyond specific business models and their effects on fair use 
rights. These commentators liken the double punch’s effects on information access and 
use to the dynamics of the land enclosure movement in pre-industrial England, a process 
characterized by dramatic social and economic dislocations (eg, Boyle, 2002, 2003; 
Benkler, 1999; Lessig, 2001). While the comparison is perhaps somewhat overblown, it is 
useful to briefly reflect on the argument to get a sense of what may be at stake. 
 
For centuries, England’s aristocrats had permitted peasants to live on and utilize their 
lands in exchange for a share of their crops. A set of economic and technological changes 
–specifically new techniques for textile production and access to new markets due to 
falling transport costs– fundamentally altered the calculus on which the previous order 
had rested. England’s aristocrats forced the peasants off the lands and used it to raise 
sheep and sell wool instead. Marking their assertion of authority, landowners enclosed 
their properties with walls and hedges that still characterize England’s countryside today. 
While peasants could certainly climb the walls, doing so constituted illegal trespassing, 
which became punishable by law. Landowners’ physical enclosure of their property, 
backed by legal safeguards, fundamentally changed economy and society. Land suddenly 
became seen as a tradable commodity and England saw the rise of a land market as well 
as a new class of landed entrepreneurs. The flipside was the formation of a substantial 
landless class of former peasants that moved to the cities to avoid starvation. There, they 
became a cheap labour pool, the very urban proletariat on which the industrial revolution 
would later thrive.[36] 
 
Are there parallels between England’s land enclosure movement and what the double 
punch may do to information? There are certainly some. England’s aristocracy had owned 
its land long before the enclosures. However, the economic and technological context 
made it insensible to exert control over how that land was used. The peasants 
consequently treated it as a commons, a resource to be shared by many. Similarly, long 
before the digital age, copyright has given recording companies, movie studios, and book 
publishers’ ownership over the information contained in their products. Yet ownership had 
meant control over distribution, not control over use. The latter was neither technologically 
feasible, economically sensible, nor normatively justifiable. The digital revolution appears 
to alter this calculus. Just as England’s aristocrats fenced off their lands and deployed the 
law against trespassers, copyright owners are enclosing information and have won strong 
legal sanctions against suspects attempting to climb the electronic fences.[37] 
 
 
The parallel can also be extended to the consumer side. England’s peasants learned the 
hard way that they had never really owned the land they had lived on and had lived off for 
generations. The peasants had little recourse when the rightful owners asserted control 
over access to and use of  their land. Similarly, contemporary music enthusiasts have 
grown up using ‘their’ records and CDs however way they wanted. No wonder so many 
have a hard time understanding why the recording industry all of a sudden can control 
where, when and how many times a user may listen to a song he ‘bought’. Owners of 
Hollywood movies on videotape always had the right to fast forward through the 
commercials at the beginning. Using DRM, Hollywood studios are now beginning to 
disable the fast forward function on DVD players during commercials, even if the 
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consumer legitimately bought the disc in a store.[38] And tampering with the electronic 
lock that disables these discs’ fast forward function of course constitutes a crime under 
the DMCA. 
 
Given some parallels between the two cases, commentators see copyright owners’ 
deployment of both legal and technological means to assert sweeping control over the 
terms of access and use of copyrighted material as endangering the ‘information 
commons’, the amount of information previously held in the public domain for the benefit 
of all. Just like the original enclosure movement divided society into landowners and a 
landless class, the future may bring a sharp division among information haves and 
information have-nots (Benkler, 1999, 2001). 
 
Despite a few parallels, there are of course many differences that set the two cases apart. 
England’s aristocrats did not rely on peasants as customers the way the music industry 
needs KaZaA users. Land is a scarce and finite commodity whereas information clearly is 
not. Medieval peasants had virtually no political rights but today’s consumers of music, 
movies and books constitute a broad cross-section of democratic societies. 
 
The comparison’s value thus lies not in predicting an outcome but rather in illustrating 
what may be at stake in current debates. Intellectual property rules –in law and in 
practice– define what is property in an information age. To the extent that the double 
punch of law and technology is much more than merely a legitimate fight against piracy –
and there is good reason to believe it is more– we should be very conscious that we are 
putting in place essential pillars for the emerging information society. Do we want to 
somehow replicate the current balance of producer and consumer rights in the new digital 
environment or are we ready to accept an asymmetric pay-per-use model of information 
access? Critics are right to point out that the music industry and other copyright holders 
may well decide that universal pay-per-use is not in their interest.[39] But are we –as a 
society– comfortable leaving a question as important as this up to the strategic marketing 
and product design departments of a few major companies?  
  
The Politics of Copyright: Elite Bargaining and International Forum Competition 
 
Given that so much appears to be at stake, how come the debate over the future of 
copyright in the digital age has been cast almost exclusively in terms of fighting Internet-
enabled piracy? It is well known that concentrated and highly organized interests tend to 
have greater influence on policy than diffuse and unorganized actors. Two aspects of 
contemporary copyright in particular have shaped the debate in the incumbents’ favour. 
For one, copyright is a highly technical and complex body of law, privileging a small group 
of experts. Secondly, owing to the rise of markets that cut across states and political 
boundaries, crucial decisions are increasingly made on the international level. In light of 
these dynamics, it will be difficult to channel the current debate into a broad dialogue 
about the role of intellectual property rights in the information age. 
 
While copyright rests on a few fairly simple principles, actual copyright law and 
jurisprudence are incredibly complex. Periodically –often prompted by new technologies– 
copyright has been renegotiated, leaving a convoluted set of rights and responsibilities 
that only copyright lawyers fully understand. As the law got more complex, the US 
Congress increasingly relied on copyright lawyers working for industry to draft necessary 
new statutes (Litman, 2001). This process, as Jessica Litman (2001:62) contends, has left 
copyright with a clear bias in favour of incumbents, often to the detriment of new market 
entrants and consumers. Looking ahead, she argues, 
  
 
‘Current stakeholders have controlled the playing board for nearly a century, and would 
doubtless prefer to keep it that way. Although they squabble with one another over 
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specifics, they have managed to unite in fierce opposition to copyright revision bills 
drafted without their participation. The 1990s saw an astonishing increase in copyright-
related campaign contributions –making it increasingly unlikely that Congress would 
support a movement to divest copyright stakeholders of responsibility for drafting 
copyright legislation.’ 
  
When legislators have intervened in the past to safeguard the public interest, they have 
done so generally through specific exemptions and exceptions, as noted above, not 
positive consumer rights. As a result, consumers are often fully unaware of their rights 
and consequently have not mobilized when recent reforms began to do away with 
established fair use privileges. 
 
Even worse for consumer and new entrants, incumbents are even more influential in the 
international arena where many crucial decisions are now taken. In the 1980s, intense 
lobbying by a highly influential group of American and European industry leaders led 
governments to address growing international piracy and counterfeiting through trade 
policy (Sell, 1995, 2003). The result was the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) agreement, concluded under the Uruguay Round in 1994. The treaty 
makes protection of intellectual property mandatory and gives the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) a critical role in international enforcement. TRIPS has awarded 
domestic trade authorities important roles in intellectual property policy, and trade policy 
makers have tended to favour producer interests even more than traditional copyright, 
patent and trademark officials (Doern, 1999). 
 
The TRIPS agreement also put significant pressure on the previously noted World 
Intellectual Property Organization to embrace a more producer-friendly agenda. WIPO 
had historically focused on coordinating international patent, trademark and copyright 
registration systems and had been particularly concerned with facilitating knowledge flows 
from North to South. With the WTO’s assumption of a central role in the field of 
international intellectual property policy, WIPO saw its continued relevance threatened. 
Seeking to affirm its place, WIPO’s secretariat quickly launched a diplomatic conference 
on two new copyright treaties for the digital age. One of these treaties is the previously 
noted WIPO Copyright Treaty that called on signatories to criminalize circumvention of 
electronic locks and to ban circumvention technologies. Both treaties are noteworthy for 
their pro-producer orientation. Challenged in its position by the WTO, WIPO has thus 
responded by offering powerful copyright holders an even better deal than TRIPS.[40] 
Copyright holders, as a result, can increasingly shop for the most receptive policy forum, 
further reinforcing their position. 
  
Fighting Music Piracy While Maintaining the Balance 
 
The politics of copyright make it unlikely that the double punch of law and technology can 
be undone. Technical complexity, intense lobbying and the ability to ‘forum shop’ 
internationally give powerful copyright owners a clear edge over new entrants and 
consumers. These politics notwithstanding, it may not even be sensible to try to undo the 
double punch. After all, enclosing information in electronic containers re-establishes 
product excludability, making it less likely that markets will fail. As we have seen, 
however, the double punch also grants producers a basis for sweeping control over 
patterns of consumption. Resisting the temptation to employ the double punch to this end 
will surely be difficult. In fact, there is already evidence copyright owners are beginning to 
curtail consumer rights. 
 
 
The goal for policy makers therefore must be to ensure that copyright owners deploy the 
power of the double punch only to combat piracy and to stimulate a dynamic and properly 
functioning market, but not to undermine consumer rights or to keep new entrants out. 
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With respect to public policy, achieving this outcome requires fostering competition in the 
industry and strengthening the position of consumers. But public policy alone is unlikely to 
suffice. It is critical that the large number of stakeholders currently caught in the middle 
between the recording industry and music pirates take a stand. Given their position in the 
heart of the controversy, a special role and responsibility falls to artists, authors and the 
organizations that represent their interests. 
  
The Role of Artists 
Prominent artists’ support for the record industry’s legal pursuit of Napster was critical to 
legitimize in the eyes of many the fight against online music sharing. Four years later, as it 
becomes apparent that the recording industry is mixing the fight against piracy with 
aggressive efforts to cement the industry status quo, artists and the organizations that 
represent them should now weigh in on the side of competition and consumer rights. 
 
In the spring of 2000, the rock band Metallica and the rapper Dr Dre launched 
independent copyright infringement lawsuits against Napster, adding considerable clout to 
the lawsuit initiated by the record labels.[41] Soon thereafter, seventy popular artists took 
out full-page advertisements in major US newspapers to oppose online music piracy and 
to demand respect for their creative work.[42] These statements enabled the Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA) –the organization that represents the five major 
record labels– to portray its fight as being on behalf of the entire music industry and 
especially on behalf of the artists. It was clear that in the battle for public opinion, touting a 
grave threat to artistic creativity would be more effective than citing falling profits for multi-
billion dollar record companies. In the eyes of many, the positions of prominent artists and 
the major labels became hard to distinguish, and the artists’ popularity legitimized the 
RIAA’s tactics. 
 
The coalition of artists and record labels is noteworthy because the two are frequently at 
odds. With almost 90% of the recorded music market under the control of the big five 
labels, artists often complain they are forced to submit to unfavourable terms. Many artists 
had initially hoped the Internet would break the big five’s stranglehold on the industry. For 
a new digital music market to flourish on the Internet, however, the challenge posed by 
Napster and online piracy first had to be countered. In fact, many industry observers 
viewed the court-ordered shutdown of Napster as a way of granting industry incumbents 
some additional time to adjust to the digital challenge, develop innovative new business 
models that take advantage of new technological opportunities, and then compete with 
new entrants on a level playing field. 
 
Several years later, however, the incumbent record companies are still far from 
establishing viable online services, in large part because they resist cutting into their 
established business of selling CDs on which their market power rests. Instead they are 
deploying the double punch to maintain the pre-digital status quo. The recent, high profile 
law suits against hundreds of individual file sharers who never benefited commercially 
indicate that the recording industry still believes it can turn back the clock and get the 
genie of online file-sharing back in the bottle. Were it only intended as a one-time strong 
reminder that illegal music downloading is copyright infringement that can lead to serious 
legal consequences, the strategy of suing individuals might have some limited success. 
But RIAA lawyers are already preparing future rounds of lawsuits and stirring considerable 
concern with their demand that Internet Service Providers take on de facto law 
enforcement and monitoring roles in support of the recording industry.[43] Aggressively 
suing your customers is generally not a good strategy to keep them and the artists 
certainly know this. 
 
 
Just like the artists themselves, organizations that represent their interests and collect 
royalties on their behalf are caught between consumers and the recording industry. To 
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defend artists’ ability to receive fair compensation for their work, organizations such as 
Spain’s Sociedad General de Autores y Editores (SGAE) and its counterparts in other 
countries have launched their own campaigns against music piracy. While the recording 
industry and artists’ organizations have thus been allies, or at least are perceived that way 
in public, the latter –just like artists themselves– should have little interest in a dramatic 
alteration of the copyright status quo made possible by the double punch. Over the past 
century, the development of sophisticated and reliable royalty collection systems has 
proved that compensating authors and artists does not require tight post-sale control over 
ordinary consumers’ usage of copyrighted material. Recent efforts –led by BMI of the US, 
Germany’s GEMA, France’s SECAM, Italy’s SIAE and SGAE– to develop a ‘FastTrack’ 
system for cross-border royalty tracking are an important step towards a balanced digital 
future.[44] The choice ahead is not merely one of all-out piracy or universal pay-per-view, 
and organizations representing artists have both an interest in making this clear and 
evidence to back it up.  
  
New Entrants and Competition 
A wave of new entrants is currently trying to seize the space left open by the incumbent 
record companies’ persistent failure to establish viable online music distribution services. 
Several of these demonstrate that innovative online music distribution services can satisfy 
the interests of consumers, artists and the recording industry. The most prominent of 
these is Apple’s iTunes music store. Launched in April 2003, it has become the most 
successful legal online music service. While its 99 cents a song downloads represent only 
a fraction of all music downloaded on a given day, iTunes now accounts for roughly 70% 
of all legally downloaded music. Steve Jobs, Apple’s CEO, sums up the strategy:  
  
‘We’re going to fight illegal downloading by competing with it. We’re not going to sue it. 
We’re not going to ignore it. We’re going to compete with it.’[45] 
  
The secret of iTunes’ success, according to Jobs, is that the service offers high quality, 
reliable, one-click downloads that are coupled with liberal usage rights. Users can listen to 
songs whenever they want as often as they want and they can even burn them on CDs. 
The successful parallel marketing of Apple’s iPod, a mobile music player with huge 
storage capacity, and the simplicity of the iPod / iTunes interface has given users 
compelling alternatives to CD burning. iTunes are encoded in Advanced Audio Coding 
format or AAC, rather than MP3. While Apple touts the standard’s superior sound quality, 
the real reasons for its reliance on AAC is that it has some moderately strong DRM built 
in.[46] 
 
New services such as iTunes demonstrate that artists were right to believe the Internet 
could indeed revolutionize music distribution while at the same time guaranteeing respect 
and reward for artists’ creativity and hard work. The success of iTunes thus provides 
artists and the organizations representing their interests with an opportunity to reinsert 
themselves into the debate and simultaneously take issue with online piracy and the 
recording industry’s coercive tactics. 
 
But the success of iTunes also has important implications for public policy, for, ultimately, 
successful new business models and the mobilization of artists will not solve all problems. 
iTunes demonstrates that the future of the music industry should be determined by market 
competition and not decided in court rooms. Policy makers need to abandon their bias in 
favour of the pre-digital industry status quo and instead take steps to encourage 
competition. 
 
 
An additional reason for iTunes’ success is that Apple not only boosts a high profile but 
also has committed considerable financial resources. The company has therefore 
managed to get fairly good deals from the major record companies, enabling it to offer an 
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extensive music library from which customers can download and burn on CDs. 
Independent start-ups such as Listen.com, in contrast, bargain from a much weaker 
position. In fact, when Listen.com’s Rhapsody service only offers a song for streaming 
and not for download, or when it does not permit a song to be burned, Listen.com is only 
following its contractual obligations. Given such discrepancies, competition authorities 
should scrutinize the relationships between record labels and third-party online service 
providers, particularly the extent to which incumbents may seek to unfairly keep new 
entrants out through tight restrictions on what they may offer. 
 
To strengthen competition, there are also things policy makers should not do. As noted 
above, having failed to develop universal industry standards through its Secure Digital 
Music Initiative (SDMI), the RIAA is now lobbying policy makers to mandate by law the 
embedding of specific DRM technologies in certain products. Policy makers should resist 
such calls, as they are likely to further strengthen the incumbents’ already strong position. 
Similarly, policy makers should stick to previous policies that limit Internet Service 
Providers’ liability and not require them to become de facto copyright enforcement agents. 
  
Bolstering Consumers 
A second major emphasis of public policy should be strengthening the position of law-
abiding consumers. The recording industry has launched a successful media campaign to 
impress upon consumers what they may not do with copyrighted material. The recent 
wave of lawsuits against non-commercial file sharers is clearly designed to intimidate 
consumers. What is necessary as a counterpoint to these tactics is a concerted effort to 
inform consumers what rights they actually have. Only informed consumers can 
effectively participate in a contest among different visions for the future of music. Pam 
Samuelson warns that the recording industry’s current strategy aims at changing 
consumers’ expectations about what they may legitimately demand from a service 
provider. Many consumers simply do not know for example, that their inability to burn 
legitimately downloaded songs onto a CD has to do with the pricing and marketing 
strategies and not with copyright. As long as vast information asymmetries prevail 
between producers and consumers, the ‘market for music business models’ is likely to 
remain uncompetitive. In other words, we need strong, informed consumers to let the 
market determine the future of digital music. 
 
Looking beyond the immediate case of online music, it is clear there will be more 
copyright disputes in the information society, not fewer. To clarify consumers’ rights and 
responsibilities, it would be desirable if policy makers began moving away from 
establishing consumer rights through negative exemptions and exceptions from copyright 
obligations, and instead defined a positive set of rights that cut across industries and 
types of media. This is certainly not likely to happen overnight. In the short run, policy 
makers should therefore assure that consumers can actually exercise their rights vis-à-vis 
copyright owners. As noted above, the DMCA’s anti-circumvention clauses and similar 
provisions in European law make it illegal for consumers to acquire tools to enjoy certain 
fair use rights, for example. In this respect, recent efforts in the United States to modify 
the DMCA and permit consumers to circumvent electronic locks to exercise fair use rights 
are an important first step to re-establishing a more balanced situation.[47]  
  
The Prospects for a Balanced Fight Against Piracy 
 
This section has sketched some elements of a strategy to ensure the legitimate fight 
against music piracy does not undo the balance of producer and consumer rights on 
which copyright has traditionally rested. The case of iTunes shows that online music 
distribution can respect the interests of artists and consumers at the same time. The 
recording industry still has time to establish serious online businesses. After all, in many 
other areas of e-commerce incumbents who adapted to the new environment are now 
thriving. But policy makers should make it clear that the recording industry cannot expect 
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to use the fight against piracy as a way to stifle competition and innovation. Strengthening 
consumers and promoting competition is the best hope for a fair and balanced contest 
over the future of music in a digital age.  
  
Conclusion 
 
The highly polarized and publicized conflict between the recording industry and online 
music piracy has promoted extreme positions. While the recording industry and its 
lobbyists warn of an end to property and creativity, proponents of file sharing portray the 
technology as a last bulwark against total domination of the music industry by a handful of 
corporate giants. The reality is of course different. Digital network technologies are not by 
nature the antithesis of property, nor are they anything else by nature –it all depends on 
what they are used for. At the same time, there is no reason why current developments 
must inevitably lead to dramatic media concentration and near perfect control over 
consumer access to information through ubiquitous embedded electronic monitoring. 
There are many ways of balancing diverse legitimate interests. Real competition between 
different propositions about the future of music would be the best way out of the present 
situation. 
 
As this study has argued throughout, much more than merely the issue of online music 
piracy is at stake. Underneath lies a much broader debate about the future of property in a 
digital age. The music controversy is the first instance where what used to be a purely 
academic debate about copyright in a digital age plays out on centre stage. Solving or at 
least containing the problem of online piracy without letting the recording industry impose 
draconian control measures on consumers would therefore be an important signpost for 
the future. But it could of course also go the other way. The motion picture industry is 
closely watching how file sharing is affecting online music and the music industry. While 
DVD encryption provides an initial line of defence, bandwidth and file storage limitations 
are the main reasons online movie sharing has not yet reached Napster-like dimensions. 
Hollywood is currently reviewing its own legal arsenal, knowing it is probably only a matter 
of time until movie file-sharing becomes a mass phenomenon. 
 
In the information society, intellectual property conflicts such as the one over online music 
will become more common, not less. Movies and electronic publishing are obvious 
additional areas of current concern. Even more important in the long run is the ongoing 
debate over the scope and extent of gene patents. In a not too distant future, patients 
might see themselves confronted with serious intellectual property questions about their 
own genes as customized drugs become commonplace. 
 
Intellectual property rules will be an important cornerstone on which new information 
markets will rest. Citizens and consumers, therefore, urgently need a better understanding 
of their current rights and responsibilities. Otherwise, rules governing property in the 
emerging information society will be made exclusively by a small group of experts with 
fairly narrow interests. Too much is at stake to leave the settlement entirely up to a 
handful of corporate executives and their lawyers. We urgently need a broad societal 
debate that goes way beyond the narrow issue of music file-sharing. The need to address 
certain policy question on the international level makes it difficult for diverse stakeholders 
to engage critical questions, but it does not make it impossible. The stakes may not be as 
high as they were for England’s peasants during the enclosure movement, but they are 
certainly high enough to make the recording industry’s bottom line only one factor among 
many. 
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